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This  paper  attempts  to  draw  conclusions  regarding  Risk  Management  instruments 
(RMI) for potential development or expansion in the EU (Garrido and Bielza, 2007). 
Using data from EU countries, compiled in the course of two EU research projects 
about RMIs, we perform a cross-sectional analysis of the role of agricultural insurance 
and ad hoc payments. Tests of comparisons of means of key insurance data reveal the 
impact of insurance policies and the degree of competitiveness in supply side. While the 
presence of subsidies explains differences across EU member states' (MSs) insurance 
data, the degree of competitiveness is not a differentiating factor. In the last part of the 
paper, we rate a number of RMIs on the basis of a number of criteria. We conclude that 
RMIs  on  EU  scale  should  be  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  very  diverse  risk 
contexts, farmers’ demands and ongoing national programmes. Our conclusions may be 
useful in defining RMIs within the scope of European Agricultural Policy, and as an 
extension of similar studies (Cafiero et al. 2005; European Commission (2006a). 
 
1  Scope and objectives 
 
This paper attempts to summarise the policy-relevant conclusions that emerge from a 
more thorough review of risk management instruments for agriculture. It builds on 
relevant literature, on recent work commissioned by EU institutions (Parliament: 
Cafiero et al. 2005, and the European Commission 2005, 2006a, 2006b) and on 
qualitative field work carried out by the authors in several EU countries. In the first 
section, the distinction between business risks and catastrophic and crisis risks is briefly 
reviewed in the second section. In the third section, we review some of the instruments 
                                                 
1   Summary paper of the review carried out pursuant to WP4 of “Income stabilisation”, European 
Project 'Design and economic impact of risk management tools for European agriculture', Contract 
Number: 006613. See Annex 1, with the full document (Garrido & Bielza, 2007).   3 
used by MSs . Country data from the EC (2006a), combined with other sources and the 
authors’ own findings, provide a snapshot of the current situation and of important 
trends. The fourth section summarises the major findings of the literature about the 
advantages and disadvantages of the most common risk management instruments. We 
conclude with a discussion of the three proposals of the EC (EC, 2005), which have 
attracted most attention recently (Cafiero et al.2005; EC, 2006a). 
2  Business risks vs catastrophic and crisis risks  
 
Risk is as facet of hazard and is endogenous to the ability to cope, not a fundamental 
concept by itself. Policies and risk management instruments target both aspects, in an 
attempt to reduce vulnerability to hazards. Defined in these terms, precise risk 
measurements are difficult to come by, because the errors in defining and measuring 
hazards and vulnerability multiply the errors associated with risk evaluations. For 
instance, Cafiero et al. (2005) contend that, after the 2003 CAP reform, EU farmers’ 
income will be more stable, contrary to a widely held belief, which is grounded on the 
supposition that EU farm prices would be more volatile (Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2005; 
Antón & Giner, 2005).  
Cafiero (2005) and the European Commission (2006a) use regional indicators of 
yield variability, droughts and other variables mapped in GIS. While these certainly 
convey an idea of the sources of the regional variability of yields on continental scale, 
they fail to draw a clear distinction between entrepreneurial and catastrophic risks. Very 
little about the actual vulnerability of farms can be learned from these maps, in part 
because farmers are generally speaking well prepared to cope with their usual risks. 
Few direct measurements and analyses of the income variability of European farms are 
available. Comparing the income variability of farms of various countries included in 
the FADN., Vrolij and Poppe (2007) show that the largest and more competitive farms 
tend to experience larger revenue instability (both in absolute and relative terms) than 
smaller farms. More productivity and size may be associated with more exposure and 
income stability, but also with greater accessibility to credit and a wealth of risk 
management instruments. 
 Furthermore, no study is available that evaluates the short- and long-term 
consequences of serious crises for EU farmers. While there is a notable lack of research 
on what policies are most effective in dealing with risks on EU scale, a great deal of 
research has addressed specific risks on a regional or even smaller scale. Unfortunately, 
typical business risks, which are less difficult to manage in the EU, have been paid 
much more attention than crises and disasters.  
 
3  Risk management instruments in practice 
3.1  Policy and risk management instruments across EU 
countries 
 
As the European Commission (2006a) clearly details, there is a great diversity of policy 
options, risk management instruments and initiatives among MSs. Duringthe past five 
years, a number of MSs (notably Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain) have given a 
serious impulse to policies aimed at providing farmers with a safety net. Others, 
including UK, Germany and The Netherlands, still rely on ad hoc relief and catastrophe   4 
compensation, and have reinforced farmers’ training programmes for coping with risks. 
This great diversity of measures results from at least three different factors: (1) the types 
of risks and hazards faced by MSs’ farmers differ widely, (2) the extent to which farm 
holdings have been consolidated and restructured, and (3) the various approaches of MS 
to help farmers to cope with risk.  
  Animal health policy is perhaps the only area in which the EU has developed a 
common approach to reduce risks’ diseases. Unlike other agricultural risks, contagious 
animal diseases have regional, market and even human health implications. One key 
strategy for the protection of European livestock and citizens is to intensify border 
controls and enforce traceability, animal identification and labelling (European 
Commission 2006b). While this recent evaluation indicates a number of strengths and 
positive views, there are areas which demand renewed efforts. In particular, the way in 
which ad hoc compensation schemes are co-funded by the EU and MS may create 
incentives for moral hazard both at farms and MSs levels. As Mangen and Burrell 
(2003) show, the financial consequences for national farms on and off quarantine zones 
create winners and losers, depending on whether exports are banned and on the 
magnitude of the epidemic. Consumer welfare also depends on the severity of an 
outbreak and on its market implications.  
  Leaving aside the EU's initiatives in the area of animal health, the following 
variables have been proposed to represent MSs’ policy approaches
2: (1) Percentage of 
ad hoc and fund payments over total agricultural output (including crop and livestock); 
(2) Percentage of insurance premia over agricultural output (including also crop and 
livestock premia). 
  As figure 1 shows, MSs’ national policies stand between two extremes 
represented by the UK and Spain. Based on recent data, the UK has mostly relied on ad 
hoc payments while Spain relies on agricultural insurance. Note that, apart from these 
countries, most MSs spent less than 1% on both insurance premia and funds/ad hoc 
contributions. The combined expenditure on ad hoc payments and insurance in the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia are among the highest in the EU. In the following 
sections, we sharpen the focus on the differences among MSs in the area of ad hoc 
payments and insurance. 
 
 
Figure 1. Ad hoc payments vs. insurance (annual payments expressed in % of 
total agricultural production) 
                                                 
2   Unless noted all data used in this section is borrowed from (European Commission 2006a), 
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According to data from the EC (2006a), almost all MSs make ad hoc payments and a 
smaller percentage have either public or private stabilisation funds. Ad-hoc payments to 
livestock growers are common in UK, Ireland, Belgium, Poland, Germany and Sweden 
(not represented in Figure 1 because of lack of insurance data). Ad-hoc payments to 
crop farms are mostly related to frost, drought, hail and excessive rainfall. In France and 
Germany droughts have taken more than 65 and 30% of the ad-hoc payments made in 
the last ten years. On the basis of the available data, total annual ad-hoc payments in the 
EU are about €1 billion (considering a period that varies among MS and ranges from ?? 
?? 
  The EU has played a leading role in promoting animal health during the past 
decade (Council Decision 90/424/EEC). It has financed losses caused by animal disease 
using ad-hoc compensations by means of market support instruments, and loss-based 
compensation, using the ‘veterinary fund’. The veterinary fund is fed by livestock 
farmers and/or MSs’ contributions (it varies across MSs). The total budget for 
veterinary measures under Decision 90/424/EEC has peaked to €563 million in 2001 
(with 80% assigned to the emergency fund for veterinary complaints, and 20% to 
disease eradication) and fell to €220 million in 2005 (with 91% and 2.2% in the same 





￿  Agricultural insurance 
 
Agricultural insurance is offered in the EU in a wide variety of formats and with a wide 
degree of public-sector involvement. It is also evolving, with some member states such 
as Austria, Italy, France and Spain showing significant growth in the past few years.   6 
European Commission document EC (2006a) has offered the most detailed compilation 
since those authored by Forteza del Rey (2002) and OECD (2000). 
  The major findings of these sources can be summarised by looking at the 
proportion of insured production and the impact of premium subsidies on some other 
key parameters. 
  In Figure 2 we plot the proportion of insured crop production and the proportion 
of insured animal value against livestock production in most MSs for which data are 
available. In the left panel, we expand the scale to allow for a better representation of 
MS with low insured production. Note that percentages vary significantly across MS, 
with Austria, Germany, Denmark and the Czech Republic with the largest insured 
proportion of output. In the middle group, we find France, Cyprus and Spain.  
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Data source:  European Commission (2006a), Eurostat and own fieldwork. Length series vary with countries
 
 
  Insurance policies vary significantly across MS, more than Figure 2 suggests. 
There are a number of factors that help us to understand these differences.  
  First, agricultural insurance exists both with and without the governmental 
support in the form of premium subsidies. Furthermore, even if a country has a high 
insurance penetration rate among crop and livestock farmers, that does not mean that all 
crop or animal risks are covered. In Figure 3, we plot the situation as regards three key 
variables. The vertical axis represents premium subsidies measured as a percentage of 
total premium. The horizontal axis measures the ratio of premium to total insured 
production. The size of the circle represents total premium against total agricultural 
production. 
  Figure 3 helps identify three groups of MSs. There is the group of Mediterranean 
countries (except Greece, not shown because of the lack of information) in the upper 
right-hand side. These countries subsidise intensely the premia, and premia are 
relatively large with respect to total agricultural output. At the other extreme, we find   7 
Germany, Denmark, France, Eire and Sweden. These countries’ premia and subsidies 
are relatively small or zero. Total premia are also relatively small compared to the value 
of farm production. The size of the circle represents the percentage of total agricultural 
production that is normally insured. Data show that penetration rates are greater in 
countries where insurance is less subsidised, though coverages are broader in the 
Mediterranean countries.  
  Figures 1, 2 and 3 portray a landscape at EU level that can be summarised by the 
following trade-off. In order to provide a safety net, MSs can resort to ad hoc payments 
in lieu of catastrophes or crises, however differently they may be defined around the 
EU, or else they can use subsidised insurance to promote the purchase of wide-coverage 
premia. Data from individual MSs suggest that unless insurance is subsidised, coverages 
are limited and rarely cover crisis losses. When these occur, government expenditure in 
the form of ad hoc payments is unavoidable. Standing between these two policy 
extremes, countries such as France, Italy or Austria are swaying in the direction of more 
insurance. France and Spain have linked the eligibility to ad-hoc funds to the purchase 
of agricultural insurance. 
 
 
Figure 3. Insurance policies across EU MSs (Subsidies  as a percentage of 
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3.2  Major institutional trends and innovation 
 
The previous brief review is no more than an updated snapshot of the situation around 
the EU. Field work carried out for this study shows that many countries are making 
progress and finding new ways of providing safety nets for their farmers.  
 
￿  Technical Innovations 
   8 
Index insurance based on vegetation indices to cover drought episodes (US, 
Spain, Canada and experimentally in France, South Africa and Ukraine).  
 
Parametric insurance (based on rainfall indices in Australia; water, rainfall and 
drought in India; rainfall indices in Morocco and Romania; this under study). 
 
Derivatives (weather-based in The Netherlands for greenhouse horticulture; river 
flow derivatives in Mexico for water supply risks).  
 
Contractual agriculture in speciality crops, using (i) forward contracting; (ii) 
downstream-upstream contracting along the market chain; (iii) derivatives and 
over-the-counter contracts (iv) bankruptcy swaps in the rural banking sector 
(throughout the EU and the US).  
 
￿  Institutional innovations 
 
Austria, Italy and France are promoting and expanding the penetration of 
agricultural insurance.  
 
France began offering an experimental pilot revenue insurance policy for oil 
crops denominated in MATIF future prices. 
 
In Spain, Italy and France, the eligibility for receipt of ad hoc aid, as well as the 
size of such aid, is becoming increasingly conditional on purchasing agricultural 
insurance. Ad hoc aids are only granted to non-insurable hazards. The 
Netherlands cancelled the programme of compensation for excessive rainfall, 
since public-sector insurance is now available. 
 
The UK is focusing on helping farmers diversify and on reinforcing training 
programmes in risk management. A proposal called “Cost-sharing” is trying to 
set up an arrangement to share the costs of fighting disease outbreaks between 
government and industry. This scheme would consist of a system of taxes which 
would accumulate from year to year, with some similarity to a fund. 
 
The Netherlands and UK do not make ad-hoc payments to compensate for 
climatic hazards.  
 
The US now offers on-line probability estimates of single and multiple climatic 
hazards for various time-scales (days, weeks, months) on a very small 
geographical scale. This offers option contracts and derivatives a chance to deal 
with very specific climate protection products (Turvey, 2007). 
4  Key lessons 
 
4.1  About agricultural insurance 
 
The history of agricultural insurance is full of bad examples and critical periods (see 
(Hueth and Furtan, 1994; Hazell et al. 1986). However, there are many other positive 
evaluations (Burgaz Moreno and Pérez-Morales, 1996; Mishra, 1996 ). Furthermore,   9 
many problems are  related to asymmetric information, and a number of problems have 
been ascribed to public participation in agricultural insurance
3: 
 
-  Lack of competition in the insurance market 
To date, no rigorous study has evaluated the degree of market power and lack of 
competitiveness. Yet, as premia are set by the insurance companies, competition among 
companies can only be based on their retailing services, and the additional insurance or 
financial services that they offer farmers. In most cases, agricultural insurance is just a 
small part of the insurance business contracted in rural areas. The lack of 
competitiveness strictly attributable to agricultural policies is likely to be small.  
  Using data collected by the EC (2006a), statistical analyses were performed in 
order to evaluate the extent to which competition in the insurance markets has some 
impact on various national insurance data. In Table 1, countries in which insurance rates 
are formed in competitive markets are separated from those in which rates are set by 
governments or where there is only one selling agency. 
 
Table 1. The impact of competitiveness on key insurance parameters among EU 
Member  States  (averages,  standard  deviation  and  means  t-tests;  n, 
number of countries included in each group) 



















































1Categories are 1 (only if single-risk insurance); 2 (if 1+ MCPI insurance) and 3 (if 2 + yield insurance) 
*p<0.05. 
Source: European Commission (2006a), Eurostat and own fieldwork and statistical analysis. The list of countries in 
included in the analysis are (a) Without competition: AU, CY, GRE, IR, LIT, LX, SP; (b) with competition: BE, BU, 
CZR, DK, FIN, FR, GER, HU, IT, LAT, NL, PL, PR, RO, SLK, SLV, SW, UK).  
 
  The comparison of means of the five variables reveals that the two groups differ 
significantly only in the percentage of insured crop production (line 2). The group with 
‘no competition’ has a significantly higher penetration rate of insurance in crop 
production. In the remaining variables the group of countries with competitive 
insurance markets does not differ significantly from the other group. 
 
-  Rent seeking by insurance companies 
                                                 
3   We are indebted to Professor Brian Wright for the ideas reviewed here.   10 
  It is often argued that insurance companies end up capturing the ?? rents // 
profits resulting from the premium subsidies (Hueth et al., 1994). While there is no 
evidence to support this conclusion, the fact that subsidies explain the growth of insured 
crops in all countries is an indication that insurance companies are surely the recipients 
of part of the subsidies. While there is no case available of a private system providing 
broad insurance coverage to growers, there is evidence of more rapid innovation in 
publicly run systems than in privately run systems.  
  
-  Excessive loading rates in comparison to banking services 
Hazell et al. (1986) compared the administrative costs of agricultural insurance in many 
countries, about 6% of the insured value, with those of other insurance sectors, 1.5%. In 
Spain, Agroseguro (SA), the pool of insurers, had a ratio of running costs over total 
liability of 0.3% in 1993, while in 2005 it was 0.25%. As new policies are based on 
indices, with a technological and IT platform and no need to perform on-site loss 
adjustment, administrative costs are bound to be reduced.  
 
-  Large transaction costs needed to prevent problems associated with 
asymmetric information 
This criticism is supported in view of the results of the US and Spain from the early 80s 
and many developing countries. More recently, actuarial imbalances have been brought 
closer in line with those needed to ensure financial sustainability. This has been possible 
because both of these countries have made an effort to screen the individual farmers’ 
risks, collect more historical individual and zonal data, and expand the portfolio of 
coverages to increase risk pooling benefits (as Table 2 shows, loss ratios are only 
slightly higher in MSs with premium subsidies than in MSs without them). 
 
-  Subsidised insurance crowds out other privately provided instruments 
No serious study has been conducted that deals with the use of more than RMI. In those 
countries where insurance has been publicly developed and uptake rates are high, 
farmers are generally given the option of selecting from a wide menu of coverages and 
policy formats. Data on insurance participation show that, at least in Spain, very few 
farmers exhibit continuous and invariable insurance strategies (Garrido & Zilberman, 
2007). This result suggests that farmers follow economic incentives, learn from their 
insurance experience and select their portfolio of instruments according to rational (or at 
least pseudo-rational) criteria. Traditionally, insurance strategies have been combined 
with the use of financial instruments, to which insured farmers have enjoyed 
preferential access granted by rural banks. It is very likely that insurance makes some 
risks much more transparent and that insurance experience helps farmers dissociate the 
sources of risks to which they are exposed.  
  In an attempt to evaluate whether premium subsidies have an impact on some of 
the key insurance variables, we performed some statistical tests to  differentiate those 
countries with insurance subsidies (AU, CY, CZR, FR, IT, HU, LAT, LIT, LX, PR, RO, 
SLK, SLV and SP) from those without them (BE, BU, DK, EST, FIN, GER, IR, NL, 
PL, SW, UK), using the data compiled by the EC (2006a). In Table 2, we compare for 
those countries for which data are available the proportion of insured animal production, 
the proportion of insured crop production, the premium over insured production, loss 
ratios and insurance types.  
 
   11 
Table 2. The impact of insurance subsidies (averages, standard deviation and 
means t-tests; n, number of countries included in each group) 





















































1Categories are 1 (only if single-risk insurance); 2 (if 1+ MCPI insurance) and 3 (if 2 + yield insurance) 
*p<0.05. 
Source: European Commission (2006a), Eurostat and own fieldwork and statistical analysis. Countries included in the 
analysis are: (a) With subsidides AU, CY, CZR, FR, GRE, HU, IT, LAT, LIT, LX, PL, PR, RO, SLK, SP; (b) 
without subsidies BE , BU, DK, EST, FIN, GER, IR, NL, SW, UK. 
 
  When we control for whether or not countries subsidise premia, we find 
statistically significant differences in four of the five descriptive variables. The results 
show that premium subsidies help to increase the value of insured crop value (line 1) 
and are accompanied by larger relative premia (line 3). Furthermore, premium subsidies 
tend to be associated with greater insurance diversity and coverage (line 5). However, 
the percentage of insured animal production is not significantly different among groups 
of MSs, and loss ratios are lower in countries withour subsidies.  
5  Rating of Risk Management Instruments under 
debate 
 
In the following tables we rate all the instruments that have been under discussion by 
the European Commission (2006a; 2006b) and by Cafiero et al. (2005). The bases for 
our judgment are the literature, documentation and private interviews
4. In Tables 
3a and 3b we attempt to rate each family of instruments, based on a number of criteria. 
Ratings are merely illustrative of major trends and are based on the assumption that 
instruments are applied using the best actual practice. The policy options that are 
reviewed include the EC’s (2005) three options; i.e. (1) insurance for natural disasters, 
(2) stabilisation funds and (3) provision of basic coverage against income crises; 
Cafiero et al (2005) ex-post compensation for catastrophes and incentives for lower 
hazard reduction; the EC’s (2006a) seven alternative insurance options, ranging from 
single-risk to revenue insurance and public reinsurance. 
                                                 
4   See Annex for a detailed treatment and the sources.   12 
 
Table 3a. Rating alternative RMIs (1 min - 5:max)  
Acceptance by  Policy option  Discriminates between 
normal risks, crises 
and disasters* 
(1: poor discriminant; 5 
strong discriminant) 
Addresses risks of 
livestock 
epidemics* 




1(Insurance for natural 
disasters only) 
5  1  2  1 
EC (2005)-Option 2 
(Stabilisation funds) 
1  2  2 (varies 
across MS) 
1 




2  2  3  1 
Cafiero (2005) 
alternative proposal 
(For  ad hoc crisis 
aids; only ex-post 
direct damage 
compensation)  
5  4  2  2 
EC (2007) – EU-wide system of agricultural insurance: 
(1) Single-risk or MPC  2  1  3  3 
(2) Yield insurance(a)   2  1  4  3 
(3) Whole-farm yield 
Insurance 
1  3  1  2 
(4) Income/Revenue 
Insurance 
2  4  3  4 
(5) Area index insurance 
(arable crops only) 
2  2  2  3 
(6) Indirect-index insurance  3  2  1  4 






Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Annex 
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Table 3b. Rating alternative RMIs (1 min - 5:max)  




Prone to welfare 


































EC (2005)-Option 1(Insurance 
for natural disasters only) 
1  
 
1  3  4  5  2  2  4  3 
EC (2005)-Option 2 
(Stabilisation funds) 
1   1  1  4  4  2  2  1  3 
EC (2005)-Option 3 (Providing 
basic coverage against income 
crises) 
3   2  4  5  2  4  3  5  4 
Cafiero (2005) alternative 
proposal 
(For crises’ ad-hoc aids; only 
ex-post direct damage 
compensation) 
1   2   3  4  2  1  2  2  2 
EC (2007) – EU-wide system of agricultural insurance: 
(1) Single-risk or MPC  2  1  3  4  3  1  4  1  3 
(2) Yield insurance(a)   2  2  2  3  2  3  3  2  4 
 
(3) Whole-farm yield Insurance  3  3  4  3  2  3  3  3   
(4) Income/Revenue Insurance  2  3  3  4  2  4  4  3  5 
(5) Area index insurance (arable crops 
only) 
3  2  3  2  1  4  2  4  4 
(6) Indirect-index insurance  4  1  4  2  2  2  2  2  4 
(7) Public reinsurance  1  1  2  2  2  1  2  3  3 
. Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Annex   14 
On the basis of the above ratings, it seems evident that no one instrument beats the 
others in all aspects. Furthermore, instruments that would be more appropriate for 
natural catastrophes will behave poorly for outbreaks of animal epidemies. The 
economic efficiency of public initiatives (welfare gains per € of expenditure) is greater 
with smaller coverages and guarantees. Low-coverage instruments also provide a 
screening device to set up eligibility conditions for ad-hoc payments related to non-
insurable risks. A growing number of MSs are building on this type of conditional 
eligibility, encouraging the connection of different instruments, and offering dual 
approaches that include privately provided instruments and public safety nets. 
Iinstruments that can be administered at less cost, using IT technologies, indexing 
components, with no or little need for loss adjustment also have a better chance of 
offering more value at the lowest cost. 
 
Finally, the instruments that seem to best complementprivately offered instruments and 
that are more compatible with other EU policies also offer the most basic forms of 
protection. These include catastrophe insurance or single-peril insurance, policies which 
the private sector offers in many countries and which it could increasingly promote in 
the near future, especially if loss adjustment procedures can be made online or using IT.  
 
6  Conclusions 
 
The following ideas appear to have strong support from the literature and the 
experiences reviewed so far: 
 
 
1.  Contingent-state contracts, futures/options and other index derivatives are useful 
mechanisms. However, agriculture in the EU is extremely diverse under natural 
conditions, as in terms of risks and structural situations. Widely traded 
securities/assets that permit hedging risks will be difficult to develop, because 
basis risks and trading costs will be a serious obstacle to ’ take-up by farmers. 
Yet, as technological innovations enable the development of more diverse index 
instruments, a market may develop for these in the EU. At present, the use of 
financial instruments among farmers and even cooperatives is low. 
 
2.  A diverse set of risk-management instruments should target multiple risk 
sources both within farm boundaries and across the market chain from the farm-
gate to the wholesale market. In highly capitalised agriculture, we are seeing 
major innovations in contractual agreements along the market chain that will 
enable professional farmers to externalise part of their risks. 
 
3.  When risk instruments are subsidised, it is a general rule that instruments with 
improved coverage and risk reduction potential come with lower subsidy 
efficiencies. More euros are needed in relative terms to provide better risk 
reduction effects, when these are already large. Yet, in the case of insurance, 
reducing subsidies would likely be followed by lower rates of use of 
instruments.  
 
4.  Actuarial ratios of mature and growing agricultural insurance systems have 
shown consistency and soundness. Actuarial techniques have improved   15 
significantly, helping countries control problems of asymmetric information and 
of poor loss adjustment procedures. On the EU scale, actuarial ratios do not 
differ significantly among MSs with or without subsidised premia. The era of 
poor insurance performance indicators around OECD countries came to an end 
in the mid-1990s.  
 
5.  Growing insurance portfolios increase the effects of risk-pooling and reduce the 
cost of reinsurance in relative terms. Some hazards, such as droughts or 
epidemics, for which disaster payments are offered in some countries, are now 
insurable.    16 
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